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INTRODUCTION 
On April 1, 2009, the Supreme Court ruled in 14 Penn Plaza LLC v. 
Pyett1 that a union can bargain away a member’s right to seek judicial relief 
for employment discrimination.  The Court had already resolved that an 
employee could bargain away that right for herself,2 and the recent decision 
only expanded the notion that statutory rights may be overwritten by con-
tract.  In the Supreme Court’s current view, private dispute resolution 
through arbitration is preferable to litigation.  The Court seems undeterred 
by the Congressional mandate that claims arising under, for example, Title 
VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964,3 the Fair Labor Standards Act of 
1938,4 the Americans with Disabilities Act,5 the Age Discrimination in 
 
∗ Kathryn A. Sabbeth, is an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of North Carolina.  
David C. Vladeck is a Professor of Law at Georgetown University Law Center and directs 
the Institute for Public Representation.  Prior to joining the Georgetown faculty, Professor 
Vladeck was an attorney with Public Citizen Litigation Group, a public interest law firm, 
where he participated in litigating some of the cases discussed in this Article, urging courts 
not to find that statutory rights could be subject to pre-dispute mandatory arbitration agree-
ments. 
 1. 129 S. Ct 1456, 1474 (2009). 
 2. See Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 35 (1991). 
 3. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -17 (2006) (“Title VII”). 
 4. 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (2006) (“FLSA”). 
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Employment Act,6 and the Civil Rights Act of 1991,7 are to be enforced by 
the federal judiciary.  With the Court’s approval, pre-dispute, mandatory 
arbitration provisions have become ubiquitous in contracts for employment 
and consumer goods, forcing employees and consumers to arbitrate, rather 
than litigate, their statutory claims. 
What is the significance of this trend for the enforcement of federal laws 
and the vindication of the rights conferred by those laws?8  A number of 
scholars have devoted empirical research to this question, many arguing 
that arbitration is not as bad as it seems if one looks at real outcomes.9  
There are at least two significant problems with these analyses.  First, put-
ting aside any methodological flaws in the individual studies, everyone 
agrees that the data available is extraordinarily limited, and even the degree 
of the limitation is unknown.  This is because arbitration is a private, often 
confidential process, the initiation, outcome, and reasoning of which are 
generally invisible to the public and unavailable to social scientists.  As 
others have suggested, drawing conclusions from the small fraction of 
available data is meaningless and misleading.10 
A second curious aspect of the empirical literature, which has received 
less criticism, is its narrow focus on a single question: courts are expensive, 
so does arbitration provide the litigants with more bang for their buck?  
 
 5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-213 (2006) (“ADA”). 
 6. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (2006) (“ADEA”). 
 7. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (2006). 
 8. There is an ongoing, robust policy debate over the impact of the growth of pre-
dispute, mandatory arbitration on our civil justice system.  See, e.g., Lewis L. Maltby, Pri-
vate Justice: Employment Arbitration and Civil Rights, 30 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 29 
(1998); Rex R. Perschbacher & Debra Lyn Bassett, The End of Law, 84 B.U. L. REV. 1 
(2004); Judith Resnik, Whither and Whether Adjudication?, 86 B.U. L. REV. 1101 (2006); 
Jean R. Sternlight, Creeping Mandatory Arbitration: Is It Just?, 57 STAN L. REV. 1631, 
1648-53, 1671-72 (2005). 
 9. Theodore J. St. Antoine, Mandatory Arbitration:  Why It’s Better Than It Looks, 41 
U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 783, 795-96 (2008). 
 10. See generally Taylor Lincoln & David Arkush, Public Citizen, The Arbitration De-
bate Trap 23 (2008), available at http://www.citizen.org/documents/Arbitration 
DebateTrap(Final).pdf (canvassing the empirical evidence on arbitration in depth and dem-
onstrating why the evidence is insufficient to back up claims about mandatory arbitration’s 
efficiency and fairness); David Sherwyn et al., Assessing the Case for Employment Arbitra-
tion: A New Path for Empirical Research, 57 STAN. L. REV. 1557, 1564-67 (2005) (describ-
ing differences between cases adjudicated in court versus cases resolved in arbitration); 
Stephen J. Ware, The Effects of Gilmer:  Empirical and Other Approaches to the Study of 
Employment Arbitration, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 735, 753-57 (2001) (discussing 
studies comparing arbitration and litigation); id. at 756-57 (suggesting empirical literature 
may be futile); W. Mark C. Weidemaier, From Court Surrogate to Regulatory Tool:  Re-
Framing the Empirical Study of Employment Arbitration, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 843, 
854-56 (2008) (describing how outcome-oriented research neglects “filtering” mechanisms 
that alter which cases end up in litigation or arbitration). 
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Even those who question the wisdom of mandatory arbitration generally 
adopt this analytic approach.  Conceding that arbitration costs less overall, 
they raise concerns about the hurdle of arbitration fees, whether grievants 
win as often and as much as they would in court, and whether the arbitra-
tion process disproportionately rewards repeat players.11  Even the theorists 
who direct their inquiries towards fairness evaluate it by comparing the in-
terests of plaintiffs and defendants, ignoring the benefits of statutory en-
forcement beyond those accrued by individual parties. The trouble with this 
approach is that what is at issue is not simply private interests, but public 
rights.12 
Measuring the economic utility of arbitration for isolated individuals 
might make sense if contract law were independent of, or superior to, statu-
tory law, as the Court seemed to believe in Lochner.13  Applying a con-
 
 11. See, e.g., Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability:  The Forthcoming, Near-Total 
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373, 430 (2005) (arguing that pre-
dispute, mandatory arbitration provisions which waive class actions threaten to undermine 
statutory guarantees in employment and consumer cases); Samuel Issacharoff & Erin F. De-
laney, Credit Card Accountability, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 157, 170-77 (2006) (arguing that pre-
dispute, mandatory arbitration provisions which waive class actions threaten to drive out 
low value claims, leaving corporations unaccountable); Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1651-52.  
A 2002 report by Public Citizen, The Costs of Arbitration, available at http://citizen.org/ 
publications/print_release.cfm?ID=7173, provides substantial empirical support for the ar-
gument that in consumer cases, costs of arbitration to the consumer substantially exceed the 
costs of litigation, even if the aggregate costs are lower. 
 12. David Schwartz argues that most arbitration scholarship legitimates mandatory arbi-
tration, sometimes even contrary to the intent of the author, by focusing on the detailed ap-
plication of the phenomenon, while ignoring “big picture questions” that are no longer in 
vogue.  Yet he also suggests that hammering away at big picture questions makes writers 
irrelevant to the real world and foolish to academics, so perhaps writing about arbitration at 
all is worthless.  See David S. Schwartz, If You Love Arbitration, Set it Free:  How “Manda-
tory” Undermines “Arbitration”, 8 NEV. L.J. 400, 420-21 (2007).  We believe, however, 
that the big picture remains highly relevant, especially given the recent Penn Plaza decision 
and legislative proposals to exempt employment and consumer contracts from the reach of 
the FAA.  See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 110th Cong.  One reason why 
we focus on mandatory arbitration is that, unlike some of the other ills that confront the civil 
justice system, this one could be remedied, in large measure, by congressional action. 
 13. In the famous case of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45, 62 (1905), the Supreme 
Court struck down a New York law that aimed to protect the health and welfare of bakery 
employees by restricting their working hours to a maximum of ten per day and sixty per 
week.  The Court stated that whether the statute was “valid as a labor law, pure and simple, 
may be dismissed in a few words.  There is no reasonable ground for interfering with the 
liberty of a person or the right of free contract” to determine the hours of a baker.  Id. at 57.  
The Court went on to hold that “the freedom of master and employee to contract with each 
other in relation to their employment, and in defining the same, cannot be prohibited or in-
terfered with, without violating the Federal Constitution.”  Id. at 64.  Lochner was formally 
overruled in West Coast Hotel Co. v. Parrish, 300 U.S. 379 (1937), and it is generally un-
derstood to represent since-discredited views, but many of the arguments made to support a 
broad application of the Federal Arbitration Act recall Lochner’s libertarian underpinnings. 
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tract-based approach to the adjudication of statutory rights, however, leaves 
out a key player: the legislature.  Congress passed anti-discrimination laws 
because it wanted to end discrimination in the workplace, and Congress 
saw public adjudication of these claims as an important part of the fight 
against discrimination.14  In a similar vein, Congress passed consumer-
protection statutes because it recognized the wide disparity in bargaining 
position between corporate sellers and consumer purchasers and wanted to 
protect consumers from corporate overreaching.  Empowering consumers 
to bring suit in federal court, where their claims could be aggregated into 
class actions, was seen as vital to leveling the playing field between con-
sumers and corporations.15  Congress added cost-shifting provisions in both 
the anti-discrimination and consumer protection statutes so that individuals 
could serve as private attorneys general and enforce those laws in court, 
where transparency and adherence to the law are matters of first principle. 
Arbitration, on the other hand, is conducted out of public view and is 
less constrained by the letter of the law.16  Governing statutes appear to 
play a minimal role in arbitrators’ decisions.17  Arbitration does not de-
velop precedent, nor does it allow for appellate review of conflicting deci-
sions.18  Even when arbitrators do produce written opinions, the decisions 
by and large remain unpublished and unavailable; some arbitration services 
require written decisions, which they make publicly available, but even 
 
 14. See, e.g., Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co., 415 U.S. 36, 48 (1974) discussed infra 
Part I.A. 
 15. See, e.g., supra note 11 and accompanying text. 
 16. Judicial review of arbitration awards is exceptionally narrow and highly deferential.  
See, e.g., Major League Baseball Players Ass’n v. Garvey, 532 U.S. 504, 509 (2002) 
(“courts are not authorized to review an arbitrator’s decisions on the merits” even if the fact-
finding was “silly”); Brentwood Med. Assocs. v. United Mine Workers, 396 F.3d 237, 239 
(3d Cir. 2005) (upholding arbitration award even though it was grounded on “glaring” mis-
takes of law); Rich v. Spartis, 516 F.3d 75, 82 (2d Cir. 2007) (holding that an arbitrator’s 
ruling may be overturned only for manifest disregard for the law and only in the “severely 
limited” circumstance where the court finds that the “arbitrators knew of the governing legal 
principle yet refused to apply it”). 
 17. Patricia A. Greenfield, How Do Arbitrators Treat External Law?, 45 INDUS. & LAB. 
REL. REV. 683, 692-93 (1992) (many arbitration decisions do not apply statutory law at all, 
or do so making conclusory judgments that neither interpret nor create precedent).  But see 
Christopher R. Drahozal, Is Arbitration Lawless?, 40 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 187, 207-15 (2006) 
(arguing that current evidence is inconclusive as to whether arbitration stifles development 
of precedent). 
 18. See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 8, at 1154; Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1656-58 (2005); 
Harry T. Edwards, Where Are We Heading with Mandatory Arbitration of Statutory Claims 
in Employment?, 16 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 293, 297 (1999). 
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those decisions are often significantly redacted.19  For the most part, arbi-
tration decisions constitute a species of “secret law,” known only to repeat 
players and a few others.20  To the extent that we are considering wholesale 
acceptance of arbitration as a mandatory substitute for litigation, we must 
come to terms with the fact that we are sacrificing the public interpretation 
of public laws. 
The sphere of privacy surrounding arbitration not only frustrates any at-
tempt to study its social effects; it contravenes the public scrutiny and pub-
lic education functions Congress intended for courts to serve.  Privatizing 
the enforcement of statutory rights erodes those rights, as rights that are not 
enforced publicly vanish from the public’s eye, making the public less edu-
cated about the laws governing society and probably less likely to recog-
nize and correct the laws’ violations.  The opaqueness of the arbitration 
process also makes it easy for the protections that Congress carefully built 
into legislation to fall victim to unequal contractual bargains.  Purchasing a 
cell phone routinely requires forfeiting the right to band together in a class 
action to challenge fraud.21  As a condition of employment, individuals of-
ten unknowingly surrender their right to a jury trial.22  We suggest that 
these sacrifices and their aggregate social costs deserve attention.  In our 
view, the Supreme Court’s embrace of mandatory arbitration reflects a re-
turn to a Lochner-like veneration for the freedom to contract unrestrained 
by public laws, and the studies measuring individual interests fail to grap-
ple with this reality. 
I.  HOW WE GOT HERE 
Before turning to our critique of mandatory arbitration, we situate our 
observations in the context of a far broader assault on the civil justice sys-
tem.  As other commentators have discussed, for approximately the past 
twenty years, the Supreme Court has engaged in a procedural and substan-
tive revolution of erecting previously nonexistent barriers between ordinary 
 
 19. For example, the source information on Lexis indicates that AAA “irregular[ly]” 
releases to Lexis redacted Labor Arbitration Awards when the parties consent.  See Lexis 
Nexis, http://w3.nexis.com/sources/scripts/info.pl?294112. 
 20. See, e.g., Lisa B. Bingham, Employment Arbitration:  The Repeat Player Effect, 1 
EMP. RTS. & EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 200 (1997). 
 21. See, e.g., Wither and Whether, supra note 8, at 1139 (reproducing Prof. Resnik’s cell 
phone contract containing a class-action waiver clause); Jean R. Sternlight, As Mandatory 
Binding Arbitration Meets the Class Action, Will the Class Action Survive?, 42 WM. & 
MARY L. REV. 1, 12-16 (2000). 
 22. See, e.g., Jean R. Sternlight, The Rise and Spread of Mandatory Arbitration As a 
Substitute for the Jury Trial, 38 U.S.F. L. REV. 17, 35-38 (2003); Margaret L. Moses, Pri-
vatized “Justice”, 36 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 536, 640-41 (2005). 
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individuals and the adjudication of their rights.23  The Court’s ringing en-
dorsement of mandatory arbitration, as it pushes rights claims out of courts 
of law and into a contract-based dispute resolution system, is just one mani-
festation of this revolution, but there are many others.  Newly-fashioned 
standing jurisprudence obstructs environmental and consumer cases.24  Dis-
trict court judges suddenly enjoy license to dismiss any complaint whose 
bare allegations25 strike the judge as insufficient to make out a “plausible” 
case.26  Emerging preemption jurisprudence has foreclosed state-law claims 
in areas ranging from products liability to pensions.27  At the same time as 
the Court has wiped away longstanding, state-law rights of action, it has 
flatly refused to recognize new implied rights in the most compelling cases 
and has stripped away remedies, rendering some rights “rights” in name 
only.28  Finally, the Court’s restrictive reading of fee-shifting provisions 
 
 23. See generally HERMAN SCHWARTZ, ed., THE REHNQUIST COURT:  JUDICIAL ACTIVISM 
ON THE RIGHT, 518-19 (2002); Andrew M. Siegel, The Court Against the Courts:  Hostility 
to Litigation As an Organizing Theme in the Rehnquist Court’s Jurisprudence, 84 TEX. L. 
REV. 1097, 1097 (2006). 
 24. The Court has set a high bar for environmental cases, see, e.g., Summers v. Earth 
Island Inst., 129 S. Ct. 1142, 1150-51 (2009); Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 
563-67 (1992); Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed., 497 U.S. 871, 887 (1990).  But see Massachu-
setts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007).  These restrictive cases have also been applied to limit 
standing by consumers challenging the inadequacy of safety regulations promulgated to 
benefit consumers.  See, e.g., Pub. Citizen, Inc. v. Nat’l Highway Traffic Safety Admin., 
489 F.3d 1279, 1296 (D.C. Cir. 2007), supplemental opinion, 513 F.3d 234, 238-39 (2008) 
(per curiam). 
 25. See FED. R. CIV. P. 8, 12(b)(6). 
 26. Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 556-57 (2007). 
 27. See, e.g., Riegel v. Medtronic, Inc., 128 S. Ct. 999, 1008 (2008) (preempting state 
law claims for medical devices specifically approved by the Food and Drug Administra-
tion); Geier v. Am. Honda Co., 529 U.S. 861, 874-75 (2000) (preempting state law claims 
for automobile safety devices); Ingersoll-Rand Corp. v. McClendon, 498 U.S. 133, 138-39 
(1990) (holding that ERISA broadly preempts state law); Aetna Health Co. v. Davila, 542 
U.S. 200, 209 (2004) (same).  See generally THOMAS O. MCGARITY, THE PREEMPTION WAR:  
WHEN FEDERAL BUREAUCRACIES TRUMP LOCAL JURIES (2008); WILLIAM W. BUZBEE, ed., 
PREEMPTION CHOICE:  THE THEORY, LAW, AND REALITY OF FEDERALISM’S CORE QUESTION 
(2008). 
 28. See, e.g., Corr. Servs. Corp. v. Malesko, 534 U.S. 61, 71-72 (2001) (refusing to find 
a federal right of action for a federal prisoner abused by guards at a private prison operating 
under contract with the federal government);  Alexander v. Sandoval, 532 U.S. 275, 288-89 
(2001) (refusing to find a right of action for minorities subject to discrimination under the 
terms of a federal contract); Blessing v. Freestone, 520 U.S. 329, 344-45 (1997) (barring 
actions by beneficiaries of federal benefits administered under contract with state agencies).   
The Court’s remedy stripping of the Employment Retirement Income Security Act (“ER-
ISA”) has left every American who has a pension, health insurance, or other insurance, 
without a remedy even in the face of deliberate misconduct by the provider, notwithstanding 
that Congress authorized beneficiaries to bring suit.  See 29 U.S.C. § 1132(a) (2006); see, 
e.g., Mertens v. Hewitt Assocs., 508 U.S. 248, 254-55 (1993); Great-West Life & Annuity 
Ins., 534 U.S. 204, 210 (2002); Aetna Health Inc. v. Davila, 542 U.S. 200, 207-08 (2004); 
VLADECK_CHRISTENSEN 6/8/2009  8:37:08 PM 
2009] CONTRACTING (OUT) RIGHTS 809 
has left many lawyers who win substantial relief for rights-bearing clients 
without compensation to sustain themselves and their work.29  We focus on 
cases shunted out of public courts and into private arbitration. 
A. The Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDonald Trilogy 
To trace the emergence of the Court’s arbitration-favoring jurisprudence, 
we begin with a trilogy of cases—starting with the Court’s 1974 decision in 
Alexander v. Gardner-Denver Co.30 and its 1981 ruling in Barrentine v. 
Arkansas-Best Freight Systems, Inc.,31 and ending a decade later in 
McDonald v. City of West Branch32—that took the diametrically opposed 
view that arbitration was not well-suited to protect statutory rights Con-
gress conferred on individuals.  Each of the cases rejected the argument 
that union members had forfeited statutory claims because their employ-
ment claims were submitted to an arbitrator pursuant to their union’s col-
lective bargaining agreement with the employer and the arbitrator had ruled 
against the employee.  These cases all turned, in part, on the idea that re-
solving statutory claims should be the province of courts, not arbitrators, 
because arbitration was inherently an inferior process for safeguarding 
rights guaranteed by statute.33 
In Gardner-Denver, a unanimous Court rejected the employer’s submis-
sion that the plaintiff was barred from filing a Title VII complaint because 
an arbitrator had decided a parallel claim, brought under a collective bar-
gaining agreement, adversely to the employee.34  The Court emphasized 
that “[a]rbitral procedures, while well suited to the resolution of contractual 
disputes, make arbitration a comparatively inappropriate forum for the final 
resolution of rights created by Title VII.”35  The Court rested its conclusion 
on several factors.  One was that statutory claims were better entrusted to 
 
see generally John H. Langbein, What ERISA Means by “Equitable”:  The Supreme Court’s 
Trail of Errors in Russell, Mertens and Great-West, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 1317 (2003).  Jus-
tice White’s dissent in Mertens explained that these decisions result in the perverse “anom-
aly of . . . leav[ing] those Congress set out to protect . . . with ‘less protection than they en-
joyed before ERISA was enacted.’”  508 U.S. at 267 (citation omitted). 
 29. See, e.g., Evans v. Jeff D., 476 U.S. 1179 (1986) (approving the use of sacrifice of-
fers in civil rights cases); Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W. Va. Dep’t of Health & 
Human Res., 532 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2001) (discarding the catalyst rule in statutory fee 
cases); see also Sole v. Wyner, 551 U.S. 74 (2007) (applying Buckhannon). 
 30. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 31. 450 U.S. 728 (1981). 
 32. 466 U.S. 284 (1984). 
 33. McDonald, 466 U.S. at 289; Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 745; Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. 
at 56-57. 
 34. 415 U.S. 36 (1974). 
 35. Id. at 56. 
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generalist federal judges rather than to arbitrators.  As the Court saw it, “the 
special role of the arbitrator . . . is to effectuate the intent of the parties 
rather than the requirements of enacted legislation.”36  This is problematic, 
the Court said, because when there is conflict between the contract and Ti-
tle VII, “the arbitrator must follow the agreement.”37  Arbitrators are gener-
ally chosen by the parties “because they trust his knowledge and judgment 
concerning the demands and norms of industrial relations.”38  But “the 
resolution of statutory or constitutional issues is a primary responsibility of 
courts, and judicial construction has proved especially necessary with re-
spect to Title VII, whose broad language frequently can be given meaning 
only by reference to public law concepts.”39 
The Court also expressed serious reservations about the adequacy of the 
arbitration procedures to protect statutory rights.40  The Court noted that 
Congress had decided that private litigation was essential to the enforce-
ment of Title VII.  When an action is brought, “the private litigant not only 
redresses his own injury but also vindicates the important congressional 
policy against discriminatory employment practices.”41  The Court did not 
find the procedures available in arbitration sufficient.  One particular con-
cern was that “the factfinding process in arbitration usually is not equiva-
lent to judicial factfinding.  The record . . . is not as complete; the usual 
rules of evidence do not apply; and rights and procedures common to civil 
trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and tes-
timony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.”42  Further, 
unlike courts, “[a]rbitrators have no obligation to the court to give their rea-
 
 36. Id. at 56-57. 
 37. Id. at 57. 
 38. Id. 
 39. Id. 
 40. Id. at 57-58.  Here the Court relied on its earlier ruling in Wilko v. Swan, 346 U.S. 
427 (1953), which rejected the idea that the efficiency of arbitration outweighed the statu-
tory right of judicial review in a case involving sales of securities.  See also Scherk v. Al-
berto-Culver Co., 417 U.S. 506, 532 (1974) (Douglas, J., dissenting) (“An arbitral award 
can be made without explication of reasons and without development of a record, so that the 
arbitrator’s conception of our statutory requirement may be absolutely incorrect yet func-
tionally unreviewable, even when the arbitrator seeks to apply our law. We recognized in 
Wilko that there is no judicial review corresponding to review of court decisions. The exten-
sive pretrial discovery provided by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure for actions in dis-
trict court would not be available. And the wide choice of venue provided by the 1934 Act 
would be forfeited. The loss of the proper judicial forum carries with it the loss of substan-
tial rights.”) (citations omitted).  Wilko was expressly overruled by the Court in Rodriguez 
de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 480 (1989), which is discussed in 
some detail infra at nn.110-114 and accompanying text. 
 41. Gardner-Denver, 415 U.S. at 45. 
 42. Id. at 57-58. 
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sons for an award.”43  In sum, “it is the informality of arbitral procedure 
that enables it to function as an efficient, inexpensive, and expeditious 
means for dispute resolution,” but these characteristics “make[] arbitration 
a less appropriate forum for final resolution of Title VII issues than the fed-
eral courts.”44 
The Court’s 1981 decision in Barrentine echoed many of these concerns, 
but took Gardner-Denver one step further, emphasizing the non-
waivability of individual rights conferred by statute.  Barrentine involved 
the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”).45  The employer argued that the 
submission of an employee’s wage claim to arbitration waived the em-
ployee’s right to bring a separate action for the payment of wages under 
FLSA.  In rejecting the employer’s argument, the Court noted “[w]e have 
held that FLSA rights cannot be abridged by contract or otherwise waived 
because this would ‘nullify the purposes’ of the statute and thwart the legis-
lative policies it was designed to effectuate.”46  Permitting a union to bar-
gain away an individual employee’s FLSA rights would subvert the goals 
underlying the statute.  The Court justified its ruling by repeating many of 
the concerns raised earlier in Gardner-Denver, including that “many arbi-
trators may not be conversant with the public law considerations underly-
ing the FLSA.”47  This question about the competence of arbitrators to de-
cide public law claims was important because “FLSA claims typically 
involve complex mixed questions of fact and law,” and “[t]hese statutory 
questions must be resolved in light of volumes of legislative history and 
over four decades of legal interpretation and administrative rulings.”48  The 
Court recognized that “arbitrator[s] may be competent to resolve many pre-
liminary factual questions,” but they “may lack the competence to decide 
the ultimate legal issue whether an employee’s right to a minimum wage or 
to overtime pay under the statute has been violated.”49  The Court also re-
 
 43. Id. at 58. 
 44. Id.  One irony is that the Court thought that the only way that arbitration might pro-
vide a suitable forum for the resolution of an employee’s Title VII claims would be to en-
graft all of the guarantees of federal court litigation—especially discovery and appellate re-
view—onto the arbitration process.  As the Court put it, “a standard that adequately insured 
effectuation of Title VII rights in the arbitral forum would tend to make arbitration a proce-
durally complex, expensive, and time-consuming process.  And judicial enforcement of such 
a standard would almost require courts to make de novo determinations of the employees’ 
claims.  It is uncertain whether any minimal savings in judicial time and expense would jus-
tify the risk to vindication of Title VII rights.”  Id. at 59. 
 45. 450 U.S. 728, 730 (1981). 
 46. Id. at 740. 
 47. Id. at 743. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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peated Gardner-Denver’s reservations about the adequacy of arbitral pro-
cedures to protect statutory rights: “not only are arbitral procedures less 
protective of individual statutory rights . . . but arbitrators very often are 
powerless to grant the aggrieved employee as broad a range of relief,” in-
cluding, for example, “liquidated damages, costs, or attorney’s fees.”50 
The third case in this trilogy, the Court’s 1984 decision in McDonald, 
held that submission of a civil rights claim to an arbitrator under a collec-
tive bargaining agreement did not waive a municipal employee’s right to 
bring in court a claim under Section 1983 .51  Like Gardner-Denver and 
Barrentine, McDonald involved an employee who sought to assert a statu-
tory claim after an arbitrator had rejected his contract claim.  Summarizing 
its prior decisions in Gardner-Denver and Barrentine, the Court said that 
its rejection of a waiver-of-rights rule in those cases was “based in large 
part on our conclusion that Congress intended the statutes at issue in those 
cases to be judicially enforceable and that arbitration could not provide an 
adequate substitute for judicial proceedings in adjudicating claims under 
those statutes.”52  This concern applied with special force to Section 1983 
actions because the statute’s “very purpose” was “to interpose the federal 
courts between the States and the people, as guardians of the people’s fed-
eral rights—to protect the people from unconstitutional action under color 
of state law.”53  The Court also repeated its prior conclusion that arbitration 
is a less desirable forum for resolving statutory claims, noting that (a) a 
specialist arbitrator may not have the “expertise required to resolve the 
complex legal questions that arise” in statutory cases; (b) the arbitrator “has 
no general authority to invoke public laws that conflict with the bargain be-
tween the parties”; and (c) “arbitral factfinding is generally not equivalent 
to judicial factfinding” because the record “is not as complete; the usual 
rules of evidence do not apply; and the rights and procedures common to 
civil trials, such as discovery, compulsory process, cross-examination, and 
testimony under oath, are often severely limited or unavailable.”54 
Taken together, this trilogy of cases signaled the Court’s hostility to the 
suggestion that arbitration was a suitable replacement for litigation of statu-
tory claims.  Each decision underscored the Court’s strongly held belief in 
the need for judicial vindication of statutory rights and the inadequacy of 
arbitral procedures to safeguard the fulfillment of the objectives embodied 
 
 50. Id. at 744-45. 
 51. 466 U.S. 284. 
 52. Id. at 289. 
 53. Id. at 290. 
 54. Id. at 290-91 (citations omitted). 
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in these statutes.  McDonald, however, proved to be the high-water mark 
for this view. 
B. Gilmer and the End of the Non-Waivability Principle 
Just seven years later, in Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Co.,55 the 
Court reconceptualized arbitration of employment disputes altogether, so 
much so that it found the earlier trio of cases “far out of step with our cur-
rent strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method [arbi-
tration] of resolving disputes.”56  So what had happened?  How could a 
Court united in the belief that arbitration was inadequate to protect statu-
tory rights repudiate that view only a few years later? 
We suggest a number of reasons for this sea change.  For one, the period 
between 1984 and 1991 brought about a seismic shift in the Court’s com-
position.  Chief Justice Burger and Justices Powell, Marshall, and Brennan 
all left the Court between 1984 and 1991, with Justices White and Black-
mun following in 1993 and 1994, respectively.  Thus, retirements and ap-
pointments reshaped the Court within a relatively brief time span. 
For another, the seeds of discontent over the Court’s hostility to arbitra-
tion of statutory claims had been sown, at least in part, in Barrentine, the 
only one of the trilogy not to have been decided by a unanimous Court.  
Chief Justice Burger, joined by then-Justice Rehnquist (who became Chief 
Justice in 1985, upon Burger’s retirement), dissented in Barrentine, and 
their opinion foreshadows the Court’s later movement away from non-
waivability.  Justice Burger’s dissent made two points, which together 
formed the cornerstone of the Court’s new pro-arbitration jurisprudence. 
The first was that, given the national policy favoring arbitration agree-
ments, there was no reason why an employee, or an employee’s union, 
could not in an arm’s-length transaction agree to have statutory claims re-
solved conclusively in binding arbitration.57  The question in the dissent’s 
view was not waiver of statutory claims, but consent (albeit not by the em-
ployee himself, but by a self-interested agent) to arbitrate statutory 
claims.58  The fact that the agreement effectively waived the employee’s 
right to file suit if disappointed with the arbitration award was untroubling 
to the dissenting Justices.  The dissent simply dismissed the concern that 
arbitration procedures are inadequate to safeguard statutory rights.59 
 
 55. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 56. Id. at 30 (citation omitted). 
 57. Barrentine, 450 U.S. 728, 746-47 (1981) (Burger, C.J., dissenting). 
 58. Id. at 747-48. 
 59. Id. 
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The dissent’s second point was that FLSA cases involve “routine and 
relatively modest-sized claims,” and thus could be removed from the 
docket of federal courts to stem the burgeoning litigation tide then swamp-
ing federal courts.60  In the dissent’s view, most employment cases are 
really little more than small claims actions, and like other small claims 
cases, they do not necessarily merit full-bore litigation in federal court.61  
Instead of “costly and time consuming” federal court litigation, arbitration 
provides “a swift, fair, and inexpensive remedy.”62  Here the dissenters 
were especially mindful of the burdens growing dockets were placing on 
federal courts, and feared that cases like Barrentine would further clog the 
pipelines.  To drive the point home, the dissent ends with this call to arms: 
“This Court ought not be oblivious to desperately needed changes to keep 
the federal courts from being inundated with disputes of a kind that can be 
handled more swiftly and more cheaply by other methods.”63  These rea-
sons, said the dissenters, counseled in favor of enforcing agreements to ar-
bitrate statutory wage claims, even if the agreement was entered into by the 
employee’s union and not the employee, and even if the employee never 
had access to a judicial forum to vindicate his statutory rights under 
FLSA.64 
The arguments articulated in the Barrentine dissent took root in a num-
ber of the Court’s post-McDonald cases, which quickly erased the stigma 
once attached to arbitration.  The first wave of decisions, especially South-
land Corp. v. Keating,65 held that the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) was 
not, as had been previously thought, merely a procedural statute applicable 
only in federal court, but was instead a substantive statute that preempted 
state law and applied with equal force to actions filed in state court.66  As 
the Court put it, the FAA “withdrew the power of the states to require a ju-
dicial forum for the resolution of claims which the contracting parties 
agreed to resolve by arbitration.”67  Shortly after Southland, in Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,68 the Court held that, when 
 
 60. Id. at 746. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 747-48. 
 63. Id. at 753. 
 64. See id.  The empirical evidence supporting Chief Justice Burger’s claim about the 
“inundat[ion]” of the courts was, it turns out, considerably overstated.  See, e.g., Michael J. 
Saks, Do We Really Know Anything About the Behavior of the Tort Litigation System—And 
Why Not?, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 1147 (1992) (refuting the “myth” of litigation explosion). 
 65. 465 U.S. 1 (1984). 
 66. Id. at 14-15. 
 67. Id. at 10. 
 68. 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
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presented with a claim of arbitrability, the “first task of a court asked to 
compel arbitration of a dispute is to determine whether the parties agreed to 
arbitrate that dispute.”69  A court must make this determination by applying 
the “federal substantive law of arbitrability, applicable to any arbitration 
agreement within the coverage of the Act.”70  Thus arbitrability would no 
longer be a question of state law, but one of federal law, subject to the 
Court’s control through the development of a federal common law of arbi-
tration. 
Once the Court declared that the Act had substantive content, all re-
straints were off.71  The Court then dealt with lines of cases from both state 
and federal courts regarding employment and consumer contracts mandat-
ing arbitration.  Without exception, the Court held that statutory rights—
even core civil rights—could be relegated to arbitration by contract.  We 
will first address the employment cases and then turn to the consumer mat-
ter. 
1. Employment Cases 
As noted above, until Gilmore, the presumption was that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act did not apply to employment contracts.72  The presumption 
 
 69. Id. at 625. 
 70. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 24-25 (1983) 
(stating further that the Federal Arbitration Act evinces “a liberal federal policy favoring 
arbitration agreements” and that federal law governs the interpretation and enforcement of 
such agreements). 
 71. To illustrate the consequence of this doctrinal development, consider Doctors’ As-
socs., Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996), which involved a complex franchise agree-
ment that obligated a Subway sandwich shop franchisee in Great Falls, Montana, to arbitrate 
any dispute with the franchisor (Doctors’ Associates) in Connecticut under Connecticut 
state law.  Casarotto argued that the agreement violated Montana law, which required form 
contracts containing arbitration agreements to disclose on the front page in underlined capi-
tal letters that the contract is subject to arbitration.  The Court brushed that argument aside, 
finding the Montana law preempted by the Federal Arbitration Act, which the Court read as 
preempting any state law requirement that is applicable only to arbitration, because such 
provisions can undermine the strong federal policy favoring arbitration.  Id. at 687.  Thus, 
efforts by states to highlight that a contract contains a mandatory arbitration provision are 
presumptively invalid under the Arbitration Act.  Nor will federal courts refuse to enforce 
arbitration agreements, even if the agreement appears to violate state law.  In Buckeye Check 
Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 443 (2006), the Court insisted that a mandatory 
arbitration agreement in a payday loan contract be enforced, even though the stated rate of 
the loan exceeded Florida’s usery laws.  While invalidity under state law might have pro-
vided grounds for setting aside an arbitral award, it did not provide a justification for setting 
aside the arbitration agreement.  Id. 
 72. One reflection of that view was Justice Frankfurter’s dissent in Textile Workers Un-
ion v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448, 466-68 (1957), where the Court held that Section 301 of 
the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947 (“LMRA”) implicitly granted courts authority 
to compel labor arbitration.  Justice Frankfurter’s dissent points out that the Court was 
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was based on what was seen as a common-sense reading of Section 1 of the 
Act, which excludes from the Act’s coverage “contracts of employment of 
seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers engaged in for-
eign or interstate commerce.”73  The turning point in the employment cases 
was Gilmer,74 although, as a technical matter, the arbitration agreement at 
issue was not between Gilmer and his employer, a financial services com-
pany, but was a result of Gilmer’s registration as a securities representative 
with the New York Stock Exchange.75  The Exchange required all regis-
tered agents to agree to arbitrate “[a]ny controversy” between agents and 
their employers “arising out of the employment or termination of employ-
ment of such registered representative[s].”76  Gilmer’s employer terminated 
his employment when he turned sixty-two years old; Gilmer sued, claiming 
that his discharge violated the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 
1967 (“ADEA”).77  The Court thus had to decide whether Gilmer’s statu-
tory ADEA claim could be subject to mandatory arbitration. 
In answering yes to that question, the Court began by noting that the 
FAA was enacted “to reverse the longstanding judicial hostility to arbitra-
tion agreements that had existed at English common law and had been 
adopted by American courts,”78 and that the Act manifests a “‘liberal fed-
eral policy favoring arbitration agreements.’”79  The Court then said that it 
is “by now clear that statutory claims may be the subject of an arbitration 
agreement, enforceable pursuant to the FAA.”80  To support this conten-
tion, the Court steered clear of Gardner-Denver, Barrentine, and McDon-
ald, and instead cited cases holding enforceable arbitration agreements re-
lating to claims arising out of the securities, antitrust, and racketeering 
statutes.  The thread that tied these cases to the ADEA was, in the Court’s 
view, the fact that Congress had not “‘evinced an intention to preclude a 
waiver of judicial remedies for the statutory rights at issue.’”81  Accord-
ingly, the burden was on Gilmer to show that Congress had forbidden 
 
forced to rely on Section 301 of the LRMA because Section 1 of the Arbitration Act ex-
empts labor contracts. 
 73. 9 U.S.C. § 1 (2006). 
 74. 500 U.S. 20 (1991). 
 75. The Court’s opinion does not address this question, but it is fair to wonder whether 
the securities firms that make up the Exchange preferred to have the Exchange impose this 
requirement rather than individual firms. 
 76. Id. at 23. 
 77. Id. at 23-24. 
 78. Id. at 24. 
 79. Id. at 25 (citation omitted). 
 80. Id. at 26. 
 81. Id. (citation omitted). 
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waiver of his right to go to Court to enforce his ADEA claim, not on his 
employer to show that Congress permitted ADEA claims to be resolved 
through arbitration.  This move marked a 180-degree turn in the Court’s 
approach.  In prior cases, the default was that Congress, by providing a di-
rect right of action in federal court, and by failing explicitly to authorize 
arbitration as a litigation substitute, had decided that mandatory arbitration 
was not acceptable.82  By shifting the burden to Congress to rule out arbi-
tration, the Court opened wide the gates to it.83 
Having shifted the burden, the Court quickly dispatched Gilmer’s argu-
ments.  The Court first rejected the idea that litigation, and not arbitration, 
is essential to promote the social policies furthered by the ADEA.  The 
Court asserted, without even a nod to its prior rulings, that “‘[s]o long as 
the prospective litigant effectively may vindicate [his or her] statutory 
cause of action in the arbitral forum, the statute will continue to serve both 
its remedial and deterrent function.’”84  The Court next rejected the idea 
that arbitration is structurally ill-suited to protect statutory rights.  That 
idea, embraced by the Court a few years earlier, was now seen as “far out 
of step with our current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring 
this method of resolving disputes.”85  Although the Court recognized that 
judicial procedures are more expansive than those available in arbitration, 
an agreement to arbitrate “trades the procedures and opportunity for review 
of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality and expedition of arbitra-
tion.”86  The Gilmer Court concluded that arbitration is presumed to be 
equivalent to a court in all the ways that matter.87 
 
 82. See, e.g., Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 738 & n.12; see also id. at 740 (pointing out that 
FLSA “permits an aggrieved employee to bring his statutory wage and hour claim ‘in any 
Federal or State court of competent jurisdiction.’ No exhaustion requirement or other proce-
dural barriers are set up, and no other forum for enforcement of statutory rights is referred to 
or created by the statute.”). 
 83. The courts do not even seem to be receptive to cases in which Congress has acted 
explicitly to forbid waivers.  The Federal Credit Repair Organizations Act prohibits “[a]ny 
waiver by any consumer of . . . any right of the consumer” under the Act, including the 
“right to sue.”  15 U.S.C. §§ 1679f(a)-1679f(c) (2006).  Nonetheless, some courts have held 
that the “right to sue” can mean bringing a claim in an arbitral forum and thus have upheld 
pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration provisions in cases under the Act.  See, e.g., Gay v. 
CreditInform, 511 F.3d 369 (3d Cir. 2007).  Just to drive home the irony here, in 2002, car 
dealers successfully lobbied Congress for an anti-arbitration provision that bars car compa-
nies from forcing them to arbitrate disputes; no similar provision was included to protect 
consumers from mandatory arbitration.  See 15 U.S.C. § 1226(a)(2) (2006). 
 84. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 28 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 614, 637 (1985)). 
 85. Id. at 30 (quoting Rodriguez de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 
481 (1989)). 
 86. Id. at 31 (quoting Mitsubishi, 473 U.S. at 628).  One does not need contract law to 
trade off process in favor of expedition.  Litigants are free to stipulate away these rights in 
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Gilmer did not resolve, however, the most basic statutory interpretation 
question relating to the arbitration of employment matters—namely, 
whether the FAA applies to employment contracts.  The Court resolved 
that issue in 2001, with its fractured ruling in Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. 
Adams.88  Focusing on whether Section 1’s exclusion of “contracts of em-
ployment of seamen, railroad employees, or any other class of workers en-
gaged in foreign or interstate commerce,”89 put employment contracts out 
of the Act’s reach, the majority held that the exclusion applied only to em-
ployment contracts with transportation workers, like seamen and railroad 
employees, but not more generally employees engaged in interstate com-
merce.90  The majority brushed aside the broad text of the Act, finding that 
the phrase “engaged . . . in commerce,” along with the specific references 
to seamen and railroad workers, signaled Congress’s intent that the provi-
sion should be “controlled and defined by reference to the enumerated 
categories of workers” and those similarly engaged in transportation.91 
While the dissenters found many faults with the majority’s reading of 
the Act, they concentrated much of their fire on the majority’s refusal to 
grapple with the Act’s legislative history, which “confirmed the fact that no 
one interested in the enactment of the FAA ever intended or expected that § 
2 would apply to employment contracts.”92  Indeed, the history of the Act 
 
court.  Nothing in the federal rules would forbid litigants from agreeing, with the Court’s 
approval, to limit discovery, to dispense with a jury trial, and to waive appeal rights, or to 
take other measures that would provide “simplicity, informality and expedition.”  The fact 
that litigants rarely, if ever, choose to waive these rights in court suggests that, when given a 
meaningful choice, plaintiffs in employment and consumer cases value process over expedi-
ence.  Indeed, empirical evidence shows that in entering into business-to-business contracts, 
businesses prefer litigation to arbitration and rarely enter into pre-dispute mandatory arbitra-
tion agreements.   Theodore Eisenberg et al., Arbitration’s Summer Soldiers:  An Empirical 
Student of Arbitration Clauses in Consumer and Nonconsumer Contracts, 41 U. MICH. J.L. 
REFORM 871 (2008). 
 87. 500 U.S. at 30-34. 
 88. 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 89. 9 U.S.C. § 1. 
 90. 532 U.S. at 114-15. 
 91. Id. at 115.  The majority had the unenviable task of trying to explain how its ruling 
that Section 1’s exclusion should be read narrowly was consistent with its rulings in Allied-
Bruce Terminix Cos. v. Dobson, 513 U.S. 265, 270-71 (1995) and Southland Corp. v. 
Keating, 465 U.S. 1 (1984), holding that Section 2 of the Act, which defined the Act’s cov-
erage by referring to contracts “evidencing a transaction involving commerce,” reflected 
Congress’s intent “to exercise [its] commerce power to the full.”  Id. at 112 (quoting Allied-
Bruce, 513 U.S. at 277).  Notwithstanding the Court’s longstanding rule that, as a general 
matter, words in statutes should be read in pari materia, the majority’s reading in Circuit 
City results in an interpretation of the Act that construes the word commerce in diametri-
cally opposed ways.  532 U.S. at 115. 
 92. Circuit City, 532 U.S. at 128. 
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shows that “the potential disparity in bargaining power between individual 
employees and large employers was the source of organized labor’s opposi-
tion to the Act, which it feared would require courts to enforce unfair em-
ployment contracts.  That same concern . . . underlay Congress’ exemption 
of contracts of employment from mandatory arbitration.”93  In the after-
math of Circuit City, courts have routinely enforced boilerplate, mandatory 
arbitration provisions in employment contracts, even where there is clear 
evidence that, due to the disparity in bargaining power, the employee had 
no meaningful right to reject binding arbitration.94  As various scholars, ac-
tivists, and legislators have pointed out, inequality of bargaining power was 
not a significant issue in the business contexts for which the FAA was in-
tended.95 
Circuit City was not the Court’s last word on the arbitrability of em-
ployment contracts.  On April 1, 2009, the Court handed down 14 Penn 
Plaza LLC v. Pyett,96 in which a 5-4 majority ruled that an arbitration 
clause in a collective bargaining agreement could waive union members’ 
rights to pursue judicial relief for violations of the ADEA.97  Although Jus-
tice Thomas’s opinion for the majority denies overruling the Gardner-
Denver-Barrentine-McDonald line of cases, at the very least it makes clear 
that they are on their last legs.98  Penn Plaza may prove to be critically im-
portant because of the question of agency at play in the context of the col-
lective bargaining agreement.  Courts have already shown their willingness 
 
 93. Id. at 132-33. 
 94. See, e.g., Margaret L. Moses, Statutory Misconstruction: How the Supreme Court 
Created a Federal Arbitration Law Never Enacted by Congress, 34 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 99 
(2006); Hardin v. First Cash Fin. Servs., 465 F.3d 470 (10th Cir. 2006) (upholding binding 
arbitration provision even though the employee did not sign the agreement and protested 
being bound by it, on the theory that the employee’s conduct, that is, showing up for work, 
constituted acceptance of the provision). 
 95. See, e.g., Maureen A. Weston, Preserving the Federal Arbitration Act By Reining in 
Judicial Expansion and Mandatory Use, 8 NEV. L.J. 385, 392 (2007) (describing recent leg-
islative findings that FAA “was intended to apply to commercial disputes between parties of 
generally similar sophistication and bargaining power”) (quoting findings of Arbitration 
Fairness Act of 2007, S. 1782, 110th Cong. § 2(1)(2)); Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1636 (ar-
bitration previously limited to business-to-business and management-union contexts, and 
Congress never conceived of it for “captive consumers or employees”);  David S. Schwartz, 
Enforcing Small Print to Protect Big Business:  Employee and Consumer Rights Claims in 
an Age of Compelled Arbitration, 1997 WIS. L. REV. 33, 75-77 (1997) (describing legisla-
tive history). 
 96. 129 S. Ct 1456 (2009). 
 97. 29 U.S.C. §§ 621 et seq (2006).  The Court reserved that question in Wright v. Uni-
versal Maritime Serv. Corp., 525 U.S. 70, 77-79 (1998), recognizing the obvious tension 
between Gardner-Denver and Gilmer, but deciding the case on other grounds. 
 98. Compare Penn Plaza, 129 S. Ct 1456, 1469 n.8 (2009) with id. at 1476-81 (Souter, 
J., dissenting). 
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to enforce employment agreements entered into by individual employees, 
resting on the fiction that employees make a volitional choice99 to bargain 
away their rights.100  But it is another step altogether to find consent on the 
part of an employee when someone else bargained away his access to court.  
This is especially troubling because workers who join unions do so to enlist 
the unions’ aid in matters of collective bargaining and resolution of con-
tract-based disputes, not to cede control over their statutory rights.101  The 
potential impact of Penn Plaza is great not only because of the more than 
sixteen million workers in the United States who are members of labor un-
ions authorized to negotiate collectively on their behalf,102 but also because 
of other situations in which an agency relationship may be inferred and 
rights waived.  
2. Consumer Cases 
To the extent that there was an analogue to the Gardner-Denver-
Barrentine-McDonald line of cases in the consumer context, it was the 
Court’s early decision in Wilko v. Swan,103 which held that a mandatory ar-
bitration agreement in a brokerage contract between a customer and a secu-
 
 99. The evidence overwhelmingly suggests that individuals entering into consumer and 
employment contracts are generally unaware that they have agreed to waive their right to 
sue.  See, e.g., Linda J. Demaine & Deborah R. Hensler, “Volunteering” to Arbitrate 
Through Predispute Arbitration Clauses:  The Average Consumer’s Experience, 67 LAW & 
CONTEMP. PROBS. 55, 73-74 (2004) (citing lack of information and the difficulty of deci-
phering arbitration clauses, most consumers do not knowingly waive right to sue); Christine 
M. Reilly, Achieving Knowing and Voluntary Consent in Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitra-
tion Agreements at the Contracting Stage of Employment, 90 CAL. L. REV. 1203, 1225 
(2002) (demonstrating that employees “do not understand the remedial and procedural rami-
fications of consenting to arbitration” and that “[v]ery few are aware of what they are waiv-
ing . . . .”). 
 100. This view is, of course, at odds with the Court’s concern in Gardner-Denver and 
other cases that labor unions serve an important equalizing function because of employers’ 
massively superior bargaining power.  It is also reminiscent of Anatole France’s comment 
that “the majestic equality of the laws, which forbid rich and poor alike to sleep under the 
bridges, to beg in the streets, and to steal their bread.”  ANATOLE FRANCE, THE RED LILY 95 
(Frederic Chapman ed., Winifred Stephens trans., New York, John Lane Co. 1910) (1894).  
The question whether pre-dispute, mandatory arbitration agreements are consensual in any 
meaningful way has been the subject of extensive commentary, most arguing that in the em-
ployment and consumer context, these provisions are ones of adhesion that are not subject to 
bargain.  See, e.g., Richard M. Alderman, Pre-Dispute Mandatory Arbitration in Consumer 
Contracts:  A Call For Reform, 38 HOUS. L. REV. 1237, 1246-49 (2001); Sternlight, supra 
note 8, at 1648-53, 1671-72; Charles L. Knapp, Taking Contracts Private:  The Quiet Revo-
lution in Contract Law, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 761, 787-89 (2002). 
 101. See Barrentine, 450 U.S. at 734-35. 
 102. U.S. Dep’t of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics, Union Member Summary (Jan. 28, 
2009), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/union2.nr0.htm. 
 103. 346 U.S. 427, 438 (1953). 
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rities firm could not be enforced under the terms of the Securities Act.  At 
the core of the Court’s ruling was its concern that enforcing the arbitration 
agreement would run counter to Congress’s directive providing a right of 
action, under the Securities Act that disputes be resolved in court.104  The 
Court also expressed reservations about the ability of arbitrators to provide 
substantive and procedural protections Congress thought necessary to en-
sure fair adjudication of securities claims.105 
Wilko’s ultimate demise was presaged by a procession of cases in which 
the Court distinguished and criticized the decision while upholding manda-
tory arbitration provisions in the contexts of automobile dealer franchise 
arrangements,106 antitrust claims, and securities claims arising under provi-
sions of the Act not addressed in Wilko.107  The chief case was Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc.,108 which marked the first 
time the Court held that statutory claims, as well as contract claims, could 
be subject to mandatory arbitration.  In the antitrust case of Mitsubishi, the 
Court, abandoned the “waiver of rights” theory developed in the employ-
ment context, claiming that arbitration agreements were nothing more than 
forum selection clauses, with no impact on claimants’ substantive rights.109 
 
 104. Id. at 434-35. 
 105. Id. at 437-38. 
 106. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614 (1985). 
 107. Shearson/Am. Express v. McMahon, 482 U.S. 220, 233 (1987) (observing that “the 
mistrust of arbitration that formed the basis for the Wilko opinion in 1953 is difficult to 
square with the assessment of arbitration that has prevailed since that time.  This is espe-
cially so in light of the intervening changes in the regulatory structure of the securities law.  
Even if Wilko’s assumptions regarding arbitration were valid at the time Wilko was decided, 
most certainly they do not hold true today for arbitration procedures subject to the SEC’s 
oversight authority.”). 
 108. 473 U.S. 614, 625 (1985). 
 109. The Court rejected the argument that statutory claims were not subject to mandatory 
arbitration.  The Court observed that “[b]y agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party 
does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits to their resolu-
tion in an arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum. It trades the procedures and opportunity for 
review of the courtroom for the simplicity, informality, and expedition of arbitration. We 
must assume that if Congress intended the substantive protection afforded by a given statute 
to include protection against waiver of the right to a judicial forum, that intention will be 
deducible from text or legislative history.” Id. at 628.  The Court’s ruling sparked a vigorous 
dissent by Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.  Justice Stevens 
pointed out that “[u]ntil today all of our cases enforcing agreements to arbitrate under the 
Arbitration Act have involved contract claims,” and that “neither the Congress that enacted 
the Arbitration Act in 1925, nor the many parties who have agreed to such standard clauses, 
could have anticipated the Court’s answer” that standard arbitration agreements encom-
passed statutory claims.  Id. at 646-47.  And the dissent went on to invoke the Gardner-
Denver, Barrentine and McDonald trilogy to argue at length that the procedures in arbitra-
tion are inadequate to safeguard statutory rights.  Id. at 647-57. 
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When finally presented with a direct attack on Wilko in Rodriguez de 
Quijas v. Shearson/American Express, Inc.,110 the Court did not hesitate to 
overrule it.  The Court saw Wilko as a relic of “‘the old judicial hostility to 
arbitration’”111 and said that, “[t]o the extent that Wilko rested on suspicion 
of arbitration as a method of weakening the protections afforded in the sub-
stantive law to would-be complainants, it has fallen far out of step with our 
current strong endorsement of the federal statutes favoring this method of 
resolving disputes.”112  Under the current view, “‘arbitration is merely a 
form of trial to be used in lieu of a trial at law.’”113  Since Rodriguez de 
Quijas, the Court has routinely found commercial contracts subject to man-
datory arbitration, notwithstanding the fact that the claims arise under fed-
eral statutes that provide a right of action in federal court, and notwith-
standing the presence of a state-law defense to arbitration.114  The Court 
has also suggested that arbitration agreements may waive claims for reme-
dies that would be available in court.115  The difficulty for consumers is not 
simply that the Court will compel arbitration or will uphold remedy-
stripping provision. 
The Court seems willing to compel arbitration in cases where (a) the cost 
of arbitration might foreclose the ability of the consumer to vindicate his 
statutory right, or (b) the inability to bring aggregate litigation in arbitration 
will similarly defeat the plaintiff’s claim.  The key case concerning the po-
tentially deterring costs of arbitration remains Green Tree Financial Corp.-
 
 110. 490 U.S. 477 (1989). 
 111. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). 
 112. Id. at 481. 
 113. Id. at 480 (citation omitted). 
 114. See, e.g., Preston v. Ferrer, 128 S. Ct. 978, 987 (2008) (holding that the Federal Ar-
bitration Act overrides state primary jurisdiction rules); Hall Street Assocs. v. Mattel, Inc., 
128 S. Ct. 1396 (2008) (holding that arbitrator, not court, must decide whether a stay should 
be imposed pending arbitration); Buckeye Check Cashing, Inc. v. Cardegna, 546 U.S. 440, 
448-49  (2006) (holding that a claim that a contract containing a mandatory arbitration pro-
vision is invalid under state law does not justify a failure to enforce the arbitration agree-
ment, because the clause is severable); Green Tree Fin. Corp.-Ala. v. Randolph, 531 U.S. 79 
(2000) (holding that claims arising under the Truth in Lending Act and Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act alleging failure to disclose finance charges in a consumer contract are subject to 
mandatory arbitration provisions, notwithstanding the plaintiff’s claims that the costs of ar-
bitration would preclude litigation and that plaintiff sought to maintain case as a class ac-
tion); Doctor’s Assocs. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 681 (1996) (holding Montana’s requirement 
that form consumer contracts provide clear notice that they contain a mandatory arbitration 
provision was preempted by the FAA). 
 115. Mastrobuono v. Shearson Lehman Hutton, 514 U.S. 52, 58 (1995) (noting that “the 
parties to a contract may lawfully agree to limit the issues to be arbitrated by waiving any 
claim for punitive damages,” but concluding that the agreement at issue did not waive the 
claim). 
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Alabama v. Randolph.116  The plaintiff, Larketta Randolph, purchased a 
mobile home with financing from the Green Tree Financial Corporation’s 
Alabama subsidiary.117  The loan agreement required Ms. Randolph to buy 
insurance to protect the Green Tree’s interest in the mobile home in case of 
default.118  The agreement also provided that all disputes arising from, or 
relating to, the contract, whether arising under case law or statutory law, 
would be resolved by binding arbitration.119  Ms. Randolph brought suit 
against Green Tree, alleging that the loan agreement violated the Truth in 
Lending Act120 by failing to disclose certain financing charges, and she 
later amended her complaint to add a claim under the Equal Credit Oppor-
tunity Act121 for requiring her to waive statutory causes of action by com-
pelling her to arbitrate all claims.122  She brought the action on behalf of 
herself and other similarly situated borrowers.  Green Tree filed a motion to 
compel arbitration, which the district court granted over Ms. Randolph’s 
protest that she could not afford the high fees associated with the private 
process.123  The court also denied Ms. Randolph’s motion for class certifi-
cation.124  The Eleventh Circuit reversed, ruling that the arbitration provi-
sion was unenforceable it because it did not guarantee that steep filing 
costs, arbitrators’ fees, and other arbitration expenses would not nullify Ms. 
Randolph’s ability to vindicate her statutory rights.125 
The Supreme Court reversed again, holding that Ms. Randolph had 
failed to meet her burden of showing that arbitration costs would be pro-
hibitively expensive.126  The Court recognized that Green Tree had drafted 
the agreement, which was silent as to costs,127 and that Ms. Randolph cited 
materials reflecting the cost of arbitration in other, similar cases.128  But 
that was not enough.  According to the Court, “where, as here, a party 
seeks to invalidate an arbitration agreement on the ground that arbitration 
 
 116. 531 U.S. 79 (2000). 
 117. Id. at 82. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. at 82-83. 
 120. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601-1667f (2006). 
 121. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1691-1691f (2006). 
 122. 531 U.S. at 79. 
 123. 531 U.S. at 84. 
 124. Id. at 83-84. 
 125. Id. at 84. 
 126. Id. at 90-92.  The Court first held that Ms. Randolph could properly appeal from the 
district court’s ruling compelling arbitration.  Green Tree had contended that an order com-
pelling arbitration was not a final order that was subject to an appeal; the Court disagreed.  
Id. at 88-89. 
 127. Id. at 82-83 & n.1. 
 128. Id. at 90-91 & n.6. 
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would be prohibitively expensive, that party bears the burden of showing 
the likelihood of incurring such costs” and “Randolph did not meet that 
burden.”129  The Court gave no indication of how Ms. Randolph could meet 
that burden, given that the arbitration agreement was silent as to costs, and 
the proceeding had not yet commenced.  As the four Justice dissent pointed 
out, it made little sense to fault Ms. Randolph for failing to produce evi-
dence of the costs of a proceeding not yet undertaken, and that burden 
should more properly be placed on Green Tree, which was “a repeat player 
in the arbitration required by its form contract,” and had  “superior infor-
mation about the cost to consumers of pursuing arbitration.”130  As the dis-
sent predicted, the only remedy for a consumer faced with a prohibitively 
expensive arbitration agreement is to return to court, post-arbitration, to 
challenge the allocation of costs—little help to a claimant who must sacri-
fice her statutory rights because she cannot afford the costs of arbitration in 
the first place.131 
The Court’s disposition of Randolph permitted it to avoid the other im-
portant problem presented in the case: whether an arbitration agreement is 
unenforceable where it precludes pursuit of a statutory claim as a class ac-
tion.132  The Court confronted that question three years later in Green Tree 
v. Bazzle,133 but deadlocked on the right answer.134  Bazzle involved two 
class actions by different groups of homeowners who alleged that Green 
Tree violated state lending laws.135  The contracts were silent about the 
availability of class claims.136  The company moved to compel arbitration; 
the homeowners contended that arbitration, if required, should be con-
 
 129. Id. at 92. 
 130. Id. at 96 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 131. Id. at 97.  Just so there is no mistake on this point, costs in litigation involve ex-
penses apart from simply filing fees, and, in arbitration, paying the quite substantial fees 
charged by private arbitrators.  In anti-trust, securities, truth-in-lending, or other forms of 
consumer contract litigation, the cost of hiring experts—generally subject to fee shifting in a 
statutory case—are not necessarily subject to fee-shifting in arbitration, which is a serious 
setback to plaintiffs.  See In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litigation, 554 F.3d 300, 316 n.11, 
318 n.12 (2d Cir. 2009).  In employment cases, the relevant statutes, as well as the Civil 
Rights Act fee provision, 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (2006), provide reimbursement for expert wit-
ness expenses. 
 132. At least one circuit had already answered that question by holding that an arbitration 
clause in a short-term loan agreement was enforceable even though it foreclosed the con-
sumer’s ability to pursue a class action.  Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366 (3d 
Cir. 2000). 
 133. 539 U.S. 444 (2003). 
 134. Id. at 447. 
 135. Id. at 449. 
 136. Id. 
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ducted on a class basis.137  After a complicated set of procedural maneu-
vers, the court compelled arbitration, but the arbitrations proceeded on a 
class basis, and they resulted in a substantial award to the homeowners.138 
After affirmance by the South Carolina Supreme Court,139 the U.S. Su-
preme Court vacated and remanded, although it produced no majority opin-
ion.  Justice Breyer, writing for himself and Justices Scalia, Souter, and 
Ginsburg, concluded that because the arbitration agreement was silent as to 
whether class cases were permitted, the decision on that issue belonged to 
the arbitrator and not the courts.140  Accordingly, the decision should be 
vacated and the case remanded to permit the arbitrator to make that thresh-
old decision.141  Justice Stevens concurred in that judgment, although he 
would have preferred simply to affirm the judgment of the Supreme Court 
of South Carolina.142  He made clear that he joined Justice Breyer to avoid 
the Court issuing a ruling with “no controlling judgment.”143  Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, joined by Justices O’Connor and Kennedy, dissented, arguing 
that it is for the courts to determine the meaning of arbitration agreements, 
and finding that in this case, the South Carolina courts erred by not con-
cluding that the contract excluded class action treatment of claims.144 
What is most significant about Bazzle, however, is what the Court did 
not say.  Not a single Justice voiced concern about the possibility that, on 
remand, the arbitrator would read the agreement, as did the dissent, to for-
bid class treatment of claims that in all likelihood would not be viable 
unless they were subject to aggregation.145  Not surprisingly, in the wake of 
Bazzle, sophisticated employers and sellers modified their arbitration 
agreements explicitly to forbid class treatment of claims.146  Equally unsur-
 
 137. Id. 
 138. Id. 
 139. Id. at 450. 
 140. Id. at 450-53. 
 141. Id. at 454. 
 142. Id. at 454-55 (Stevens, J., concurring in the judgment and dissenting in part). 
 143. Id. at 455. 
 144. Id. (Rehnquist, C.J., dissenting).  Justice Thomas filed a separate dissent, adhering to 
his longstanding view that the Federal Arbitration Act should not be read to apply to state 
court proceedings).  Id. at 460; see also Doctor’s Associates, Inc. v. Casarotto, 517 U.S. 
681, 689 (1996) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Allied-Bruce Terminix Cos., Inc. v. Dobson, 513 
U.S. 265, 285-97 (1995) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
 145. Indeed, in his opinion, Justice Stevens observed that the South Carolina Supreme 
Court “has held as a matter of state law that class-action arbitrations are permissible if not 
prohibited by the applicable arbitration agreement,” and that nothing in the Federal Arbitra-
tion Act “precludes” the ability of parties to prohibit them.  539 U.S. at 454. 
 146. Justice Stevens predicted this development in his questioning at argument; he asked 
Green Tree’s counsel:  “Does this case have any future significance, because isn’t it fairly 
clear that all the arbitration agreements in the future will prohibit class actions?”  Transcript 
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prisingly, because Bazzle does not suggest that contracting-out of proce-
dural guarantees would be improper, many lower courts have upheld arbi-
tration provisions that expressly forbid the use of class actions.147 
II.  THE EMPIRICAL DEFENSE 
Having seen the Court take a sharp turn in favor of arbitration, the ques-
tion we now explore is this: what are the implications of the Supreme 
Court’s revised outlook?  A great deal of ink has already been spilled on 
this topic, and we do not attempt to review or evaluate all the arguments 
and evidence that have been brought to bear.  We do wish to make a few 
observations about the existing literature on mandatory arbitration of statu-
tory rights, which, as we explain, does not provide empirical support for the 
chief defense of arbitration—namely, that it provides an adequate forum for 
the vindication of statutory rights at a lower price than conventional litiga-
tion. 
A central feature of the Court’s new pro-arbitration outlook is its expan-
sion of the scope of the FAA from voluntary arbitration agreements be-
tween businesses, or between management and unions, to pre-dispute con-
 
of Oral Argument at *55, Green Tree, No. 02-634, 2003 WL 1989562.  His prediction 
quickly came to pass.  See, e.g., Note, The Supreme Court, 2002 Term: Leading Cases: III. 
Federal Statutes and Regulations: C.  Federal Arbitration Act, 117 HARV. L. REV. 410 
(2003); Jean R. Sternlight & Elizabeth J. Jensen, Using Arbitration to Eliminate Consumer 
Class Actions:  Efficient Business Practice or Unconscionable Abuse?, 67 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 75, 85-88 (Winter/Spring 2004); see also In re Am. Express Merchants’ Litigation, 
554 F.3d 300, 314 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting that, following Bazzle, the New York Stock Ex-
change modified its rule to provide that a “claim submitted as a class action shall not be eli-
gible for arbitration under the Rules of the Exchange”).  JAMS, a major arbitration com-
pany, initially took the position that it would not enforce restrictions on class action 
arbitration, but reversed itself as soon as its major commercial clients, including American 
Express, Discover Card and Citibank, objected.  See Eric Berkowitz, Is Justice Served?, 
L.A. TIMES MAG., Oct. 22, 2006, at 1.20.  On the other hand, in the aftermath of Bazzle the 
American Arbitration Association altered its rules expressly to permit class action arbitra-
tions, and it is currently handling many class proceedings.  See Am. Arbitration Ass’n, Class 
Action Cases, http://www.adr.org/sp.asp?id=25562 (last visited Feb. 6, 2009) (listing all 
class arbitration proceedings AAA has administered or is currently administering). 
 147. It would probably be an understatement to say that the law is, at least currently, in 
disarray on the validity of blanket class action waivers.  Some circuits approve them gener-
ally.  See, e.g., Anderson v. Comcast, Corp., 500 F.3d 66, 72 (1st Cir. 2007); Gay v. Credit-
Inform, 511 F.3d 369, 381 (3d Cir. 2007); Carter v. Countrywide Credit Indus., Inc., 362 
F.3d 294, 298 (5th Cir. 2004); Johnson v. W. Suburban Bank, 225 F.3d 366, 374-75 (3d Cir. 
2000).  And most circuits approve them with the caveat that they will be unenforceable if 
they preclude the claimant from bringing his claim.  See, e.g., In re Am. Express Merchants’ 
Litigation, 554 F.3d 300 (2d Cir. 2009); Lowden v. T-Mobile USA, Inc., 512 F.3d 1213, 
1219 (9th Cir. 2008); In re Cotton Yarn Antitrust Litigation, 505 F.3d 274, 285 (4th Cir. 
2007); Dale v. Comcast Corp., 498 F.3d 1216, 1224 (11th Cir. 2007); Livingston v. Assocs. 
Fin., Inc., 339 F.3d 553, 557 (7th Cir. 2003). 
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tract provisions drafted by businesses and imposed on individual employ-
ees, consumers, and other relatively weaker parties.148  The Court’s view 
that individual employees and consumers can waive their right to a judicial 
forum for the adjudication of statutory claims has rested on the assumption 
that arbitration provisions constitute merely “forum-selection clauses” that 
in no way compromise substantive rights.149  The Court first announced 
this rule in Mitsubishi150 and then extended it in Gilmer.151  Since those de-
cisions, a large body of literature has developed either challenging or shor-
ing up the Court’s constructed dichotomy between procedure and sub-
stance. 
Following earlier theoretical and policy arguments, a growing number of 
scholars have undertaken empirical research comparing the outcomes of 
arbitration and litigation.152  While the role of mandatory arbitration re-
mains controversial, the empirical literature has largely clustered around a 
set of common conclusions.  The prevailing wisdom is that arbitration is 
faster and cheaper than litigation, and that claimants actually win more of-
ten in arbitration than in litigation, though these winners get lower 
awards.153  Defenders of mandatory arbitration assert that arbitration is 
shown to be generally better for everyone involved, except those few 
claimants who might have received large jury awards through litigation.154  
We question whether the existing empirical research so readily leads to this 
conclusion. 
 
 148. See Eisenberg et al., supra note 86, at 875 n.16 (collecting authorities). 
 149. The Court stated that by “agreeing to arbitrate a statutory claim, a party does not 
forego the substantive rights afforded by the statute; it only submits their resolution in an 
arbitral, rather than a judicial, forum.”  Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 
20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 
614, 628 (1985)). 
 150. See 473 U.S. at 628. 
 151. See Gilmer, 500 U.S. at 26. 
 152. See, e.g., Bingham, supra note 20.  A number of scholars have also debated the ac-
cessibility of arbitration as opposed to litigation, with many suggesting that low-income 
employees or consumers with relatively small claims are able to pursue arbitration in cases 
where they could not bring claims in court.  See, e.g., Christopher R. Drahozal, Arbitration 
Costs and Forum Accessibility: Empirical Evidence, 41 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 813 (2008) 
(summarizing research).  While the accessibility literature concerns entry into the process, 
we consider it as part of the outcome research, because if arbitration truly does serve a large 
number or a particular sector of potential claimants, that social value may be understood as 
an output or outcome of the process.  See discussion infra, Part II.B. 
 153. See Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 845-56 (summarizing studies). 
 154. See, e.g., Maltby, supra note 8. 
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A. Fundamentally Flawed Data 
As a preliminary matter, we question the validity of any generalizations 
about the comparable value of arbitration and litigation given the data upon 
which the assessments rely.  Putting aside the methodological flaws of any 
individual study, the existing data sets are necessarily limited by the private 
nature of arbitration.  Because arbitration is conducted behind closed doors, 
analyses of results reflect only those arbitrations that the parties and arbitral 
providers have chosen to make available.  Of the decisions that are pub-
lished, many are heavily redacted, making their characteristics difficult to 
assess and compare.155 
That only a subset of arbitration decisions is available for analysis would 
be less of a problem if the publicly-available decisions were representative 
of those unavailable.  Unfortunately, there is no basis for making such an 
assumption.  On the contrary, the arbitral providers that make their deci-
sions publicly available may be those with the least to hide.  Richard Bales 
has suggested that studies relying on data from the American Arbitration 
Association (“AAA”), an organization that, for example, makes labor and 
employment decisions available online, will necessarily under-represent 
unscrupulous employers or egregiously unfair arbitration provisions, be-
cause the AAA is a relatively reputable organization, which as a matter of 
practice refuses to arbitrate under rules it deems unfair.156  It is reasonable 
to surmise that, in addition to the self-selection bias of the better arbitral 
providers publishing decisions, there may also be an opt-out function by 
defendants who want the leeway to engage in bad conduct and keep their 
acts and liability shielded from public view.  Arbitration awards against 
these rogue companies will never make it into the studies. 
On top of the problems of the limited and possibly skewed data set of 
arbitrated cases, comparing arbitrated cases with those in litigation may be 
comparing apples to oranges.157  As a matter of study design, there is the 
basic fact that no two cases are exactly the same, so it is difficult to control 
for all potentially relevant factors.  Even if the sample sizes were large 
enough to smooth out differences in individual cases, the aggregate analy-
sis would remain unreliable because of the possibility of systematic differ-
ences in the types of cases funneled through arbitration and through the 
courts.  Possible differences between the sample sets could include types of 
 
 155. See Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1658. 
 156. Richard A. Bales, Normative Consideration of Employment Arbitration at Gilmer’s 
Quinceañera, 81 TUL. L. REV. 331, 349 (2006). 
 157. Bingham, supra note 20, at 199.  See Sherwyn et al., supra note 10, at 1564-67 (de-
scribing differences between cases in arbitration and in courts); Ware, supra note 10, at 753-
57 (same). 
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plaintiffs, defendants, or claims.  In the employment context at least, 
Stephen Ware suggests giving up on outcome comparison research alto-
gether, because employers who use arbitration might have better (or worse) 
lawyers or human resources departments, more experience defending em-
ployment discrimination claims, better (or worse) reputations for how they 
treat their employees, or be more capable of paying large verdicts.158 
Outcome-focused studies also neglect claims that are either settled be-
fore final disposition or never brought to arbitration or to court.159  Whether 
one views the resolution of claims without adjudication as a good or bad 
outcome in itself, it necessarily makes dollar-based outcome studies in-
complete.160  Filtering mechanisms may disproportionately keep certain 
kinds of claims or parties out of certain fora.  For example, employers that 
choose arbitration may be more likely to have internal dispute resolution 
systems in place, thereby screening out easily resolvable or non-
meritorious cases.161  Richard Bales suggests that potential defendants who 
use arbitration provisions in contracts may screen out cases through the use 
of “lopsided” arbitration agreements whose terms make arbitration so im-
balanced as to make the pursuit of arbitration seem worthless to potential 
claimants.162  This is not merely speculation.  For example, Bales notes that 
Circuit City continues to use an agreement already ruled to be unenforce-
able, presumably because the corporation saves enough by “scaring off” 
litigants to make it worthwhile to re-litigate challenges to the provision.163  
Whatever the reasons for potential claimants not reaching arbitration, as-
sessments of the accessibility of arbitration that do not account for the 
missing claimants suffer as a result. 
Aside from the fundamental flaws in the data sets, the existing empirical 
studies fail to account for significant factors.  In the next section, we turn 
our attention to the missing considerations. 
B. Neglected Societal Costs 
We suggest that existing studies defending arbitration as more efficient 
than litigation neglect significant externalities.  The current studies empha-
size decreased costs of money and time, and they demonstrate the compa-
 
 158. See Ware, supra note 10, at 756-58. 
 159. See id.; see also Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 848-54. 
 160. This critique has also been leveled against studies of litigation, but the difficulty of 
studying litigation is of course no basis for claiming the reliability of arbitration studies. 
 161. Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 850-51. 
 162. Bales, supra note 156, at 389-90. 
 163. Id. 
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rable social utility of the fora by measuring relative win/loss rates.164  The 
best of these studies recognize the distinction between costs to defendants 
and to plaintiffs, and between up-front filing fees, arbitrators’ fees, and 
costs of process.  As Christopher Drazhozal recently concluded, adminis-
trative costs and arbitrators’ fees are more expensive in arbitration than are 
filing fees in litigation, so the argument that arbitration is the cheaper alter-
native necessarily depends on savings on attorney’s fees and other costs of 
the process.165  Even where claimants’ costs and arbitrators’ fees are lim-
ited by caps or absorbed by defendants, cost savings result largely from de-
creased process costs.166 
The problem with drawing conclusions about social benefits from these 
decreased process costs, however, is that such analyses gloss over three 
critical points: (a) decreased process  disproportionately benefits defen-
dants; (b) a major source of decreased costs for defendants is not actually 
decreased process costs but decreased awards (which cannot be divorced 
from considerations of costs for claimants)167; and (c) these outcomes have 
effects beyond the interests of the individual parties to the disputes. 
To the extent that studies of arbitration focus on compensation to indi-
vidual claimants, they neglect aggregate societal benefits of public litiga-
tion, such as the enforcement of public rights and deterrence of behavior 
Congress chose to ban.  In other words, there are a number of social func-
tions of courts and adjudicative processes that arbitration may not provide, 
or may not provide as well, and to claim arbitration is more efficient simply 
because it is cheaper, while failing to account for the lost social utility, 
makes little sense.168  Adjudication by public courts produces the following 
societal benefits that are missing from arbitration: development of a consis-
tent body of precedent, through reasoned opinions that interpret statutes as 
applied to facts and may be corrected by appeals courts,169 democratic dia-
 
 164. See generally Drahozal, supra note 152. 
 165. Id. at 828-31. 
 166. Costs to plaintiffs have been lowered by caps on arbitrators’ fees, and by provisions 
whereby companies assume responsibility for those fees.  Id. at 829-30; Eisenberg et al., 
supra note 86, at 876. 
 167. See generally Drahozal, supra note 152. 
 168. See generally William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, Adjudication As a Private 
Good, 8 J. LEGAL STUD. 235 (1979). 
 169. Greenfield, supra note 17, at 683 (demonstrating that many arbitration decisions do 
not apply statutory law at all, or do so making conclusory judgments that neither interpret 
nor create precedent); see also Weidemaier, supra note 10, at 868 (highlighting “risk that 
arbitrators will ‘recast grievances in ways that downplay legal issues and that focus instead 
on more typically managerial concerns’”) (quoting Lauren B. Edelman & Mark C. Such-
man, When the “Haves” Hold Court:  Speculations on the Organizational Internalization of 
Law, 33 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 941, 967 (1999)); Edwards, supra note 17, at 297 (“Imagine, 
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logue between courts and legislatures about correct interpretation of 
laws,170 public education of potential bad actors regarding limits of the 
law,171 potential victims who might bring suit to challenge bad conduct, 
citizenry with influence on their legislators, and customers who might in-
fluence bad actors by voting with their dollars, and the democratic value of 
jury deliberations and awards.172 
All of the sources of decreased costs also decrease the deterrence of 
statutorily-prohibited behavior.  Limited discovery cuts against the party 
with the burden of proof; the absence of a jury also tilts against the plain-
tiff.173  The key reasons why the process of arbitration is considered to be 
less costly than the process of litigation—limited discovery, lack of appeal 
rights, the absence of the jury—all cut against the enforcement of laws. 
Contrary to popular wisdom, faster, cheaper litigation is not simply a 
win-win situation for all concerned.174  On the aggregate level, decreasing 
the time and money sunk into dispute resolution harms not only lawyers, as 
some suggest, but arguably also the public that benefits from the deterrent 
effects of these potential costs.175  Costs for defendants may be driven 
down even further by additional provisions that only decrease potential 
plaintiffs’ recovery amounts or likelihood of recovery but provide no bene-
fit to plaintiffs, and arguably none to society as a whole: limited damages 
provisions, reduced statutes of limitations, and unavailability of class ac-
tions that aggregate small claims and make them worth pursuing.176 
Certainly, decreased contributions of time and money will in many cases 
benefit individual plaintiffs.  For example, decreased discovery or the lack 
 
for example, the impoverished nature of civil rights that would have resulted had all race 
discrimination claims in the United States in the 1960s and 70s been arbitrated rather than 
adjudicated.”).  But see Drahozal, supra note 17, at 207-15 (arguing that current evidence is 
inconclusive as to whether arbitration stifles development of precedent). 
 170. E.g., Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 105 Stat. 1071 (amending 
civil rights statute in response to Supreme Court rulings including employment discrimina-
tion case of Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989)); see David Luban, 
Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L. J. 2619, 2637 (1995). 
 171. See Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1661. 
 172. See generally Bales, supra note 156; see also Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1661-1665 
(summarizing “public justice” objections to mandatory arbitration). 
 173. See Reginald Alleyne, Statutory Discrimination Claims:  Rights “Waived” and Lost 
in the Arbitration Forum, 12 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 381, 429-31 (1996) (discussing im-
portance of jury awards’ public function of deterring discriminatory conduct). 
 174. Bales, supra note 156, at 342-43 (describing advantages of faster resolution). 
 175. Schwartz, supra note 95, at 115 (suggesting waiver of liability makes discrimination 
less expensive, thereby decreasing the incentive for employers to take steps to avoid it). 
 176. Schwartz, supra note 12, at 413, 415; Richard A. Bales, The Employment Due Proc-
ess Protocol at Ten:  Twenty Unresolved Issues, and a Focus on Conflicts of Interest, 21 
OHIO S. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 165, 188, 191 (2005). 
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of appeal opportunities may make adjudication less expensive for plaintiffs 
who would otherwise be outspent by defendants in litigation.  But these op-
tions are available to litigants in judicial proceedings as well.  Nothing in 
the Federal Rules forbids the parties from agreeing to limit discovery, to try 
a case to a judge or magistrate judge instead of a jury, or to forego an ap-
peal.  If, as some assert, the automatic sacrifice of these procedures makes 
arbitration more accessible than litigation,177 that effect deserves considera-
tion, as accessibility has a significant social value.  Yet we need to clarify 
not only whether, in fact, arbitration increases accessibility, but also 
whether or not we have decided as a society that the increased accessibility 
justifies the sacrifices in the quality of justice dispensed.178 
The most compelling argument for promoting arbitration is that it is 
available for low-wage workers and low-claim claimants who would oth-
erwise have access to no forum at all, because courts are simply too expen-
sive.  Lawyers will not take their cases, the argument goes, because these 
individuals cannot pay out-of-pocket expenses, and their likely recoveries 
are too low to make a contingency fee worthwhile.  Arbitration, on the 
other hand, can be navigated more easily pro se, given its informality.179 
Putting aside our skepticism about the assumption that arbitration is 
simple and accessible for pro se litigants, and fairly adjudicated in spite of 
the imbalance in representation or lack thereof, we ask if there might be 
something wrong with a system of justice based on the premise that law-
yers, full discovery, and other niceties of due process are out of reach for a 
certain class of society.  Given the rough approximation of justice that arbi-
tration provides,180 are we ready to give up the adjudication of disputes 
 
 177. See St. Antoine, supra note 9. Samuel Estreicher, Saturns for Rickshaws: The Stakes 
in the Debate over Predispute Employment Arbitration Agreements, 16 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. 
RESOL. 559, 563 (2001); Maltby, supra note 8, at 60.  But see Drahozal, supra note 152, at 
840-41 (arbitration is less accessible where claims are only economical if litigated as class); 
Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1654-55. 
 178. Estreicher, supra note 177, at 563 (“In a world without employment arbitration as an 
available option, we would essentially have a ‘cadillac’ system for the few and a ‘rickshaw’ 
system for the many.”).  But see Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1654-55 (“[E]ven if it were true 
that mandatory arbitration is the Saturn, why do companies have the right to take away some 
consumers’ and employees’ Cadillacs?”). 
 179. See St. Antoine, supra note 9, at 795-96; Estreicher, supra note 177, at 563; Maltby, 
supra note 8. 
 180. See, e.g., Greenfield, supra note 17.  Arbitration awards are considered to be more 
frequent but lower than litigation awards, perhaps because arbitrators regularly “split the 
baby” instead of making all-or-nothing determinations based on legal merits; even defenders 
of arbitration recognize this may not be the best system.  Sherwyn et al., supra note 10, at 
1573, 1578 (suggesting fairness should mean not that one side wins, nor by how much, but 
that “employees prevail when they were discriminated against and awards provide the 
proper remuneration”). 
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based on the rule of law?  Even if we were comfortable with individuals 
making this choice for themselves, do we want to permit them prospec-
tively to bargain away public rights?181 
III.  CONTRACTING (OUT) STATUTORY RIGHTS 
A number of commentators have criticized the Supreme Court’s assump-
tion that arbitration provisions are simply “forum-selection clauses” with 
no limiting effect on the application of substantive law.182  Stephen Ware 
has argued that the Supreme Court’s decisions have denied the ways in 
which arbitration reduces “mandatory” rules to “default” rules and thereby 
“jeopardizes mandatory rules of law.”183  He defines mandatory law as that 
from which deviation could not be an enforceable contract term, whereas 
default law is that from which terms of deviation would be enforceable, and 
argues that mandatory law ought not to be arbitrable.184  What Ware does 
not dissect is the normative question of which laws ought to be mandatory, 
and which should be subject to contrary contract terms.185  Perhaps even 
more troubling than the failure to recognize connections between proce-
dural and substantive law, underlying the Supreme Court’s embrace of ar-
bitration is the suggestion that all laws are subject to contrary agreement 
between private parties: no law is mandatory. 
A year after Circuit City,186 writing for the Seventh Circuit in a decision 
enforcing an arbitration provision in a telephone company’s publicly filed 
tariff, Judge Easterbrook declared,  “[t]he Supreme Court has never held 
that any entitlement is outside the domain of contract, unless the statute 
forbids waiver.”187  Summarizing relevant cases, Judge Easterbrook in-
cluded among “entitlement[s]” the right to a jury trial, the standard of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt, the right to political expression, the right to at-
torneys’ fees, and “an entire civil rights claim.”188  Putting aside the accu-
 
 181. David Schwartz suggests that prospective agreements to waive statutory rights are 
particularly troubling, because individuals’ interests are more likely to be in line with those 
of society after a dispute arises.  Schwartz, supra note 95, at 119. 
 182. Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991) (quoting Mitsubishi 
Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, Inc., 473 U.S. 628 (1985)); see, e.g., Stephen J. 
Ware, Default Rules through Mandatory Rules:  Privatizing Law through Arbitration, 83 
MINN. L. REV. 703, 712-18 (1999). 
 183. Id. at 704. 
 184. Id. at 710. 
 185. Id. at 732 n.131. 
 186. Circuit City Stores, Inc., v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105 (2001). 
 187. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 
924, 928 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 188. Id. at 928-29 (summarizing cases). 
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racy of Judge Easterbrook’s characterization of the Supreme Court’s his-
tory and the particular cases he cites, his opinion points to a very real and 
radically libertarian undercurrent in the Court’s recent arbitration jurispru-
dence.189 
The hints at this philosophy in Mitsubishi and Gilmer are particularly 
worthy of note.  In response to concerns that forcing disputes into a private 
arbitral forum would harm public policies set out by the legislature, the 
Mitsubishi Court suggested that because Congress left the key to enforce-
ment in private hands, private interests could trump public law values.190  
The Court highlighted that citizens are not required to bring antitrust suits, 
nor are plaintiffs required to seek judicial approval prior to settlement of 
their claims.191  Yet the fact that the private attorneys general model gives 
way to rights-holders’ individual interests and liberties does not justify a 
fully private conception of such rights.  As the Mitsubishi Court recog-
nized, a “prospective waiver of a party’s right to pursue statutory remedies” 
would be void “as against public policy.”192  Though the Court’s holding 
depends entirely on the notion that arbitration provisions are “forum-
selection clauses”193 rather than waivers of “substantive rights,”194 the 
Court fails to explain the substance behind this distinction.  Had the Court 
addressed why a substantive waiver would be void, it might have been 
forced to confront the reality that pre-dispute arbitration clauses cause the 
same societal harms.195 
Both prospective waivers of substantive rights and pre-dispute arbitra-
tion clauses decrease deterrence of socially undesirable behavior and un-
dermine the normative force of mandatory public laws.  The examples 
listed by the Court do not suggest otherwise, as the decisions not to pursue 
a claim or to settle it are made after injuries have occurred, the time when 
rights-holders tend to value their rights more highly than when faced with 
 
 189. Id. at 929 (“One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory 
rights for something valued more highly.”) 
 190. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 635-37 (1985). 
 191. Id. at 630-33 
 192. Id. at 637 n.19. 
 193. Id. at 629-31. 
 194. Id. at 628. 
 195. Even if arbitration has advantages, this does not justify the imposition of prospective 
mandatory arbitration provisions.  For a discussion of why voluntary arbitration agreements 
after disputes arise would be preferable, see Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1654-55; Schwartz, 
supra note 95, at 116-119.  While some might suggest that parties would never agree to ar-
bitrate after-the-fact, we agree with Sternlight’s view that if this is true, this only supports 
the notion that no one with full information and bargaining power would voluntarily waive 
access to a judicial forum.  Jean R. Sternlight, In Defense of Mandatory Binding Arbitration 
(If Imposed on the Company), 8 NEV. L.J. 82, 83-84 (2007). 
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hypothetical injuries pre-dispute.196  In this sense, rights-holders’ interests 
will be more likely to line up with the enforcement of a statute after its vio-
lation.197  Even if one agreed with Judge Easterbrook that individuals 
should be free to sell their fundamental rights for “something valued more 
highly,”198 this would still leave open the question of when that value 
should be measured: there is no reason to believe the pre-dispute value is 
accurate or socially optimal; on the contrary, it is less likely to be so be-
cause it is evaluated before the injury is defined.199  While the Court claims 
not to have abandoned completely public policy exceptions to freedom of 
contract,200 its refusal to take into account pre-dispute dynamics suggests 
otherwise. 
The Court’s pro-arbitration trend also reflects a profoundly libertarian 
bent in its denial of the role of social inequality in informing legislation.201  
In Gilmer, the Court pronounced that claims of unequal bargaining power 
are best resolved on an individual, case-by-case basis.202  This assertion di-
rectly contradicted the Court’s prior jurisprudence, as well as the history of 
the Federal Arbitration Act.203  It also neglected the legislative purpose, 
present in anti-discrimination statutes among others, to protect a particular 
“class” of parties from another, more powerful class.204  While it may be 
 
 196. See Schwartz, supra note 95, at 114-16. 
 197. Id. at 119. 
 198. Metro E. Ctr. for Conditioning & Health v. Qwest Commc’ns Int’l, Inc., 294 F.3d 
924, 929 (7th Cir. 2002). 
 199. It is after a concrete injury has occurred that the rights holder is more likely to seek 
advice as to the value of the rights being waived; free consultations or contingency fee ar-
rangements make advice more available after the fact, and the presentation of the case in all 
its concrete details rather than a hypothetical problem makes the advice more accurate.  See 
Schwartz, supra note 95, at 114-16. 
 200. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 637 n.191 
(1985); Jeffrey W. Stempel, Pitfalls of Public Policy:  The Case of Arbitration Agreements, 
22 ST. MARY’S L.J. 259, 284-85 (arguing for abolition of public policy exception). 
 201. See Paul D. Carrington & Paul H. Haagen, Contract and Jurisdiction, 1996 SUP. CT. 
REV. 331, 344-45 (1996). 
 202. See, e.g., Sternlight, supra note 195; Schwartz, supra note 95, at 36; Katherine Van 
Wezel Stone, Mandatory Arbitration of Individual Employment Rights:  The Yellow Dog 
Contract of the 1990s, 73 DENVER U. L. REV. 1017, 1050 (1996). 
 203. See, e.g., Weston, supra note 95, at 392 (describing recent legislative findings that 
FAA “was intended to apply to commercial disputes between parties of generally similar 
sophistication and bargaining power”) (quoting findings of Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, 
S. 1782, 110th Cong. 1(1)); Sternlight, supra note 8, at 1636 (2005) (arbitration previously 
limited to business-to-business and management-union contexts, and Congress never con-
ceived of it for “captive consumers or employees”); Schwartz, supra note 95, at 75-77 (de-
scribing legislative history). 
 204. Stewart E. Sterk, Enforceability of Agreements to Arbitrate: An Examination of the 
Public Policy Defense, 2 CARDOZO L. REV. 481, 543 (1981); see St. Antoine, supra note 9, 
at 788-89 (acknowledging that freedom of contract bends to accommodate public policy 
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said that all law, whether statutory or based on common law, reflects value 
judgments, to suggest that all interactions between individuals carry the 
same social significance205 neglects differences in societal position and 
throws into question the role of the legislature in correcting undesirable 
imbalances of power and resources. 
At the outset of this Article we threw down the gauntlet by suggesting 
that the Court’s new pro-arbitration jurisprudence marked a return to the 
days of Lochner, where liberty of contract was unrestrained by public law 
principles and the Court invalidated statutes that purported to interfere with 
the right of contract.  We were not just trying to be provocative by raising 
the specter of Lochner.  We believe that the Court’s arbitration decisions 
come perilously close to reinvigorating that case. 
The Court’s key move towards Lochner was its re-conceptualization of 
arbitration in Mitsubishi.  There the Court discarded the waiver theory de-
veloped in Gardner-Denver and its progeny, which posited that arbitration 
was ill-suited to safeguard statutory rights, and announced instead that a 
pre-dispute commitment to arbitration was simply a forum-selection deci-
sion.206  The Court’s analogy between mandatory arbitration and forum se-
lection provisions is flawed, however, because forum selection rules are not 
choice of law rules.  Although forum selection clauses dictate the forum in 
which the dispute will be resolved, they do not dictate substantive law,207 
especially where the substantive rule of decision is provided by a federal 
statute.  To be sure, a forum selection clause may require a litigant to press 
a claim in a court of the other side’s choosing; forum selection clauses may 
compel litigation in inconvenient court, or force a litigant to bring a claim 
in state court even though the claim might otherwise be brought in federal 
court.  A forum selection clause may require a litigant to sacrifice the pro-
cedural advantages she would have in federal court, but regardless of the 
forum selected, the substantive law remains the same. 
 
goals, especially in fields with “customarily unequal participants”); Carrington & Haagen, 
supra note 201, at 334-39 (highlighting freedom of contract philosophy underlying pro-
arbitration jurisprudence). 
 205. See Stempel, supra note 200, at 351 (“[T]here is a ‘social’ or ‘public’ interest in the 
average commercial dispute just as in a securities claim or a civil rights claim.”).  In support 
of his asserting that commercial contract claims reflect social values as fundamental as civil 
rights, Stempel highlights that the U.S. Constitution recognized the importance of property 
rights.  Id. at n.431.  This logic, too, leads us back to Lochner. 
 206. Mitsubishi Motors Corp. v. Soler Chrysler-Plymouth, 473 U.S. 614, 628 (1985); see 
also Gilmer v. Interstate/Johnson Lane Corp., 500 U.S. 20, 26 (1991). 
 207. There are limits on the extent to which a state can enforce procedural rules that 
might impair the enforcement of federal rights.  See generally Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 
356 (1990); Felder v. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988). 
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Arbitration is different.  In arbitration, the substantive “law” that the ar-
bitrator must apply is the contract, not the background federal statutes,208 
and courts have routinely upheld contracts that derogate or nullify statutory 
provisions, including the right to attorneys’ fees, certain damages, jury tri-
als, and on and on.  Thus, the Court’s promise in Mitsubishi that in arbitra-
tion “a party does not forgo the substantive rights afforded by the statute” 
is, by now, hollow, and arbitration has become, with the Court’s blessing, a 
way of voiding statutory rights by contract—just as in Lochner. 
As hard as we have searched, we have yet to find a limiting principle in 
the Court’s arbitration jurisprudence.  Are there any rights so fundamental 
that they may not be bargained away?  Judge Easterbrook, for his part, 
thinks there are none.  As he put it, in language that eerily mimics Lochner: 
“One aspect of personal liberty is the entitlement to exchange statutory 
rights for something valued more highly.”209  Since Mitsubishi, the Court 
has consistently ruled that one is “entitled” to exchange one’s statutory 
right to bring suit in court for arbitration, making what we believe is the 
dubious assumption that one obtains “something valued more highly” in 
the bargain.210  Courts have also ruled that one is entitled to exchange her 
right to attorneys’ fees, punitive damages, jury trials, appeals, discovery, 
and so forth as part of the same bargain—that is, the “bargain” to get a job, 
or the “bargain” to buy a cell phone.211  The question, of course, is whether 
bargaining away substantive rights—the right to earn the minimum wage 
for one’s labor, the right to work in an environment free of sexual harass-
 
 208. See also Ware, supra note 182, at 718 (arguing that directing arbitrators to apply the 
“law that a court would apply” leaves open the question of what body of law that is, creating 
unanswerable conflicts of laws questions for a forum that lacks a common law on conflicts 
of laws). 
 209. Metro East, 294 F.3d at 929.  Judge Easterbrook amplified his point in a later deci-
sion, which left to the arbitrator the question whether an arbitration agreement could waive a 
plaintiff’s right to attorney’s fees under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Judge 
Easterbrook said:  “no general doctrine of federal law prevents people from waiving statu-
tory rights (whether substantive or procedural) in exchange for other things they value more, 
such as lower prices or reduced disputation. See Metro East, 294 F.3d at 928-29 (collecting 
authority). Whether any particular federal statute overrides the parties’ autonomy and makes 
a given entitlement nonwaivable is a question for the arbitrator.”  Carbajal v. H&R Block 
Tax Servs., 372 F.3d 903, 906-07 (7th Cir. 2004) (emphasis added). 
 210. It could be said that person values the “something” more highly, even if society as a 
whole might disapprove, and Judge Easterbrook would defend that person’s right to decide 
for herself, even if she is foolish.  The obvious problem is that empirical evidence suggests 
people enter into “agreements” without an informed, voluntary evaluation process—the 
process by which people determine the values they assign.  See, e.g., Demain & Hensler, 
supra note 99, at 73-74; Reilly, supra note 99, at 1225.  Moreover, as we have endeavored 
to emphasize in this Article, the costs of these “choices” are not just individual but collec-
tive. 
 211. See id. 
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ment, or the right to be considered for a promotion regardless of one’s 
race—rights hard-fought to obtain, are any different. 
CONCLUSION 
There is no question that litigation is expensive, but we remain puzzled 
as to why the solution to this problem should be arbitration.  All the reasons 
arbitration is cheaper than litigation cut against the rights-holder or against 
the enforcement of laws.  Commentators who argue that arbitration may be 
the only or best option for some rights-holders implicitly accept a deeply 
cynical conception of who is entitled to enjoy full remedies for a depriva-
tion of rights.  If the problem is a lack of counsel, that lack requires atten-
tion, as giving up on courts for certain segments of society is not a respon-
sible solution.  Mandatory arbitration provisions also block access to courts 
even for those who might be in the position to pursue litigation.  In this 
way, enforcement of arbitration provisions implies resigning ourselves to 
the idea that judicial enforcement of the rule of law is just too expensive for 
society as a whole to afford.  We think this sacrifice is too great. 
